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[67 C.2d 325; 62 Cal.Rptr. 26. 431 P.2d 650] 
[So F. No. 22567. In Bank. Sept. 18, 1967.] 
EDWARD J. FARLEY et al., Petitioners, v. BASIL 
HEALEY, as Acting Registrar of Voters, et al., Respond-
ents. 
[1] Mandamus - Jurisdiction - Supreme Court. - The Supreme 
Court's original jurisdiction in mandamus was available to 
petitionet·s to determine their right, denied by the San Fran-
cisco registrar of voters, to submit a proposed initiative to the 
electorate, where the superior court denied such a writ only 
three weeks before the date by which the sufficiency of the 
signatures had to be decided, and where an appeal from such 
order would thus have been an inadequate remedy. 
[2a, 2b] Municipal Corporations-Initiative-Scope of Power-
Registrar of Voters.-. Under the San Francisco Charter, the 
right to propose initiative measures cannot properly be 
impeded by a decision of a ministerial officer, even if 
supported by the advice of the city attorney, that the subject 
is not appropriate for submission to the voters, and the San 
Francisco registrar of voters exceeded his authority, under 
§ 180 of the charter, in undertaking to determine whether a 
proposed initiative was within the power of the electorate to 
adopt. 
[Sa, Sb] Id.-Initiative-Scope of Power-Registrar of Voters.-
Under § 180 of the San Francisco Charter, the duty of the 
registrar of voters is lintited to the ministerial function of 
ascertaining whether the procedural requirements for submit-
ting an initiative measure have been met, and if they have 
been met, he must place it on the ballot unless he is directed 
to do otherwise by a court on a compelling showing that a 
proper case has been established for interfering with the 
initiative power. 
[4] Id.-lnitiative-Charter Provisions-Liberal Construction.-
Charter provisions dealing with the power of initiative by the 
people must be liberally construea to promote the democratic 
process. 
[6] Id. - Initiative - Scope of Power - Resolution on Foreign 
Policy.-Section 179 of the San Francisco Charter is not so 
limited as to restrict initiative measures to those concerning 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Initiative, Referendum: and Recall, § 27; 
Am.Jur., Municipal Corporations (1st ed § 208 et seq). 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, § 77; [2, 3] Municipal 
Corporations, § 253; [4] Municipal Corporations, § 252; [5] 
Municipal Corporations, § 253(1). 
() 
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municipal affairs on which the board of supervisors could 
enact binding legislation, and in the case of a resolution or 
declaration of policy submitted for general vote at a municipal 
election, urging a line of foreign policy contrary to that of the 
federal government, the only limitation is the sufficiency of 
signatures to qualify the measure for the ballot. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel an acting registrar 
of voters and a county clerk to determine the sufficiency of 
signatures to a petition to place an initiative measure on the 
ballot and, if determined to be sufficient, to place the proposed 
initiative on the ballot. Peremptory writ granted. 
Garry, Dreyfus, McTernan & Brotsky, Benjamin Dreyfus 
... and Allan Brotsky for Petitioner. 
Marshall W. Krause, M. Lawrence Popofsky and Paul N. 
Halvonik as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
Thomas M. 0 'Connor, City Attorney, and George E. 
Kruger, Deputy City Attorney, for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioners have obtained the signatures 
of more ·than 21,000 electors of the City and County of San 
Francisco to a petition to place an initiative measure on the 
ballot urging an immediate ceasefire and American with-
drawal from Vietnam. Seeking submission of the measure to 
the voters at the November 7, 1967, municipal election, peti-
tioners tendered the signatures to the acting registrar of 
voters. On the advice of the city attorney, the acting registrar 
refused to determine the sufficiency of the signatures to 
qualify the measure for the ballot. Petitioners then sought a 
writ of mandate from the superior court. That court denied 
relief on August 31, 1967. On September 5, petitioners filed a 
petition for a writ of mandate in this court to compel the 
acting registrar of voters and the county clerk to determine 
the sufficiency of the signatures and to place the measure 011 
the ballot. 
[1] Petitioners allege that relief must be granted by Sep-
t.ember 22, 1967, to permit the determination whether they 
have sufficient signatures to qualify the measure for the bal-
lot. Accordingly, they contend that an appeal from the 
superior court's order is not an adequate remedy. Under these 
circumstances they may invoke this court's original jurisdic-
tion to determine their rig11t to submit the proposed initiative 
) 
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to the electorate despite the pendency of the superior court 
action. (Perry v. Jordan (1949) 34 Ca1.2d 87, 90-91 [207 
P.2d 47].) 1 
[2a] It must be noted at the outset that the acting regis-
trar of voters exceeded his authority in undertaking to deter-
mine whether the proposed initiative was within the power of 
the electorate to adopt. [Sa] Under section 180 of the 
Charter of the City and County of San Francisco, his duty is 
limited to the ministerial function of ascertaining whether the 
procedural requirements for submitting an initiative measure 
have been met. [2b] It is not his function to determine 
whether a proposed initiative will be valid if enacted or 
whether a proposed declaration of policy is one to which the 
-initiative may apply. These questions may involve difficult legal 
. issues that only a court can determine. The right to propose 
initiative measures cannot properly be impeded by a decision 
of a ministerial officer, even if supported by the advice of the 
city attorney, that the subject is not appropriate for submis-
sion to the voters. [3b] Given compliance with the formal 
requirements for submitting an initiative, the registrar must 
place it on the ballot unless he is directed to do otherwise by a 
court on a compelling showing that a proper case has been 
established for interfering with the initiative power. (McFad-
den v. Jordan (1948) 32 Ca1.2d 330, 332 [196 P .2d 787].) In 
Mervynne v. Acker (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 558 [11 Cal.Rptr. 
340], and Riedma·n v. Brison (1933) 217 Cal. 383 [18 P.2d 
947], such a showing was made, and the court therefore had 
no occasion to consider whether an election official on his own 
motion may refuse to submit an initiative measure to the 
electorate on the ground that it deals with a matter not 
subject to the initiative. Accordingly, neither case is contrary 
to our conclusion herein. (See Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co. 
(1960) 54 Ca1.2d 339, 343 [5 Cal.Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 575] ; 
People v. Ba·nks (1959) 53 Ca1.2d 370, 389 [1 Cal. Rptr. 669, 
348 P.2d 102].) 
Since respondents in the present case, however, have 
refused to proceed and seriously contend that the proposed 
measure should not be submitted to the voters, we deem it 
appropriate to determine whether the charter enables the elec-
torate to adopt it. 
IThe parties have stipUlated to' waive issuance of an alternative writ 
or order to show cause and to submit the ease without oral argument 
upon the petition and the memorandum of points and authorities in 
opposition. 
i' 
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The proposed measure is denominated a declaration of 
policy. It provides that "It is the policy of the people of the 
City and County of San Francisco that there be an immediate 
ceasefire and withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam so that 
the Vietnamese people can settle their own problems. " 
Section 179 of the charter provides: "The registered voters 
shall have power to propose by petition, and to adopt or reject 
at the polls, any ordinance, act or other measure which is 
within the power conferred upon the board of supervisors to 
enact, or any legislative act which is within the power 
conferred upon any other board, commission or officer to 
adopt, or any amendment to the charter .... 
" Any declaration of policy may be submitted to the electors 
in the manner provided for the submission of ordinances; and 
when approved by a majority of the qualified electors voting 
on said declaration, it shall thereupon be the duty of the 
board of supervisors to enact an ordinance or ordinances to 
carry such policies or principles into effect, subject to the 
referendum provisions of this charter. " 
[4] This power of initiative must be liberally.construed 
(Blotter v. Farrell (1954) 42 Ca1.2d 804, 809 [270 P.2d 481]) 
to promote the democratic process. (Mervywne v. Acker, 
supra,' 189 Cal.App.2d 558, 563.) [5] Despite this rule of 
construction and the broad language of the charter, respond-
ents contend that initiative measures cannot be submitted to 
the electorate unless they concern municipal affairs on which 
the board of supervisors could enact binding legislation. Sec-
tion 179, however, is not so limited. It reserves to the people 
the power to initiate "any ordinance, act or other measure 
which is within the power conferred upon the board of super-
visors to enact. . . ." As representatives of local communi-
ties, boards of supervisors and city councils have traditionally 
made declarations of policy on matters of concern to the 
community whether or not they had power to effectuate such 
declarations by binding legislation. Indeed, one of the pur-
poses of local government is to represent its citizens before the 
Congress, the Legislature, and administrative agencies in 
matters over which the local government has no power. Even 
in matters of foreign policy it is not uncommon for local 
legislative bodies to make their positions known. By their 
Resolution No. 34]-67, approved June 2, 1967, for exa.mple, 
the San Francisco Board of Supervisors commended President 
Jobnson "for his stand on the present Arab-Israeli crisis" 
and urged "that all necessary action be taken to insure 
freedom of navigation for all countries in the Gulf of 
Sept. 1967] FARLEY 11. HEALEY 
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Aqaba. " Pursuant to section 179 the people as well as their 
elected representatives may adopt such resolutions. 
Respondents contend, however, that petitioners' measure is 
not a "resolution," but a "declaration of policy" governed 
by the second paragraph of section 179. They urge that only 
declarations of policy that can be put into effect by ordinances 
can be adopted by initiative. 
The second paragraph of section 179 neither restricts the 
measures that may be submitted pursuant to the first para-
graph nor limits the declarations of policy that it authorizes 
by its own force. It does not expressly restrict the type of 
declaration that may be submitted, but instead refers to 
"any" declaration. The fact that the board's duty "to 
carry ... into effect" approved policies is inoperative when 
the policy is beyond the power of the board to effectuate, 
affords no basis for restricting the right to declare the policy. 
Only by construing the paragraph narrowly against the power 
of initiative could it be held that the voters may only declare 
policies that the supervisors could effectuate by ordinance. 
Even under such a narrow construction, however, the 
. proposed initiative is authorized, for the board of supervisors 
: can enact ordinances carrying out the policy of the declara-
tion to express the popular will. The board by ordinance can 
use the avenues of advocacy available to it to express that 
will. It can, for example, direct its legislative representative 
in Washington to make the people's position knowll, rename 
streets or buildings, or order the posting of the declaration in 
public bUildings. 
The charter contains a numerical requirement as a built-in 
safeguard against frivolous use of the initiative process. There 
is no other limitation that prevents petitioners from submit-
~ing th{\ir measure to a general vote. 
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respond-
ents to determine the sufficiency of the signatures to the peti-
tion and, if determined to be sufficient, to place the proposed 
initiative on the ballot for the municipal election of November 
7,1967. This decision is final forthwith. . 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., and Sullivan, J., 
concurred. 
BURKE, J.-I dissent. The obligation imposed upon the 
judiciary of this countryl is to interpret and apply the 
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supreme law, or sovereign will of the people. Under this 
distinctive American doctrine, termed "our greatest single 
contribution to the cause of free government," the people 
confided to the courts the responsibility to keep the power of 
government, national, state and local, by whomsoever exerted 
within the. orbit authoritatively prescribed. (1 McQuillin, 
Municipal Corporations (3d ed.) § 1.96, pp. 357-358.) 
This court's failure to uphold the responsible city officials 
of the City and County of San Francisco in their refusal to 
permit the machinery of local municipal elections to be used 
to legislate2 upon issues exclusively federal in nature is an 
abdication of that responsibility.s 
The formulation of policy with re~pect to the war in Viet-
nam is placed by the federal Constitution within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the federal government, in the Congress and 
the President of the United States. It is to the federal govern. 
ment and its responsible officials that the petitioners should 
address their plea.4 
Chartered cities are created under the authority of article 
XI, section 8, of the California Constitution, which specifies 
in subdivision (j), that "It shall be competent in any charter 
framed under the authority of this section to provide that the 
municipality governed thereunder may make and enforce all 
laws and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject 
only to the restrictions and limitations provided in their 
several charters and in respect to other matters they shall be 
subject to general laws." (Italics added; see also § 6 of art. 
XI.)5 The people of San Francisco have acknowledged this 
constitutional limitation upon municipal authority by provid-
2A declaration of policy is an exercise of legislative power. (Simps01l. 
v. Hite (1950) 36 Cal.2d 125, 130 [3] [222 P.2d 225]; Kleiber v. Oity 
etc. of San Francisco (1941) 18 Cal.2d 718, 722-723 [117 P.2d 657]; 
Hopping v. Oouncil of Oity of Richmond (1915) 170 Cal. 605, 614-617 
[150 P. 977 J; see also Reagan v. Oity of Sausalito (1962) 210 Cal. 
App.2d 618, 624 [4] [26 Cal.Rptr. 775].) 
sWe are informed that an initiative petition of similar import seek· . 
ing to force the voters of the City of New York to take an official posi. 
tion against the war in Vietnam was denied filing by the city clerk upon 
advice of the municipal corporation counsel. 
4The First Amendment to the United .States Constitution guarantee. 
to the people the right to petition the government. 
5Section 6, in pertinent part: "Cities . . • hereafter organized under 
charters framed and adopted by authority of this Constitution are hereby 
empowered, and cities . . . heretofore organized by authority of this 
Constitution may amend their charters . . • so as to become likewise 
empowered hereunder, to make and enforce all laws and regulations in 
respect to municipal affairs . .. and in respect to other matters they 
shall be subject to and controlled by general laws." (Italics added.) 
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ing in their charter (§ 2) that "The city and county may 
make and enforce all laws, ordinances and regulations neces-
sary, convenient or incidental to the exercise of all rights 
and powers in respect to its affairs . .•. " (Italics added.)6 
"Municipal affairs," as those words are used in the Consti-
tution, "refer to the internal business affairs of a munici-
pality." (City of Walnut Oreek v. Silveira (1957) 47 Ca1.2d 
804, 811 [12] [306 P.2d 453] ; Fragley v. Phelan (1899) 126 
Cal. 383, 387, 388 [58 P. 923] ; see also West Ooast Advertis-
ing 00. v. City &7 Oounty of San Francisco (1939) 14 Cal.2d 
516, 521-524 [95 P.2d 138] ; Oity of Santa Monica v. Grubb 
(1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 718 [54 Cal.Rptr. 210].) Thus in 
discussing and clarifying the extent of the powers of 
chartered cities under the constitutional grant, the court in 
West Ooast emphasized frequently and at length the" munici-
pal affairs" and "municipal purposes" aspects and restric-
tions. (See also Brougher v. Board of Public Works (1928) 
205 Cal. 426, 437 [2] [271 P. 487] ; Oralle v. City of Eureka 
(1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 808,811 [1] [289 P.2d 509].) 
Concededly, the basic rule is that statutory or charter 
provisions dealing with the power of initiative and referen-
dum are to be liberally construed in favor thereof. (Gage v. 
Jordan (1944) 23 Ca1.2d 794, 799 [1] [147 P.2d 387] ; Blotter 
v. Farrell (1954) 42 Ca1.2d 804, 809 [3] [270 P.2d 481] ; 
Hunt v. Mayor &7 Oouncil of Oity of Riverside (1948) 31 
Ca1.2d 619,622-623 [1] [191 P.2d 426].) But no liberality of 
construction, however indulgent, can contravene the express 
constitutional restrictions limiting to municipal affairs the 
initiative legislation which may be adopted by a chartered 
city. 
To focus our attention upon what is within the ambit of 
"municipal affairs," McQuillin points out that "Modern city 
government controls the things that touch the home and life 
of the citizen, such as law and order, protection of life, limb 
and property, safety on the streets and everywhere within the 
corporate limits; protection from lawlessness, from traffic 
danger, from fires; safeguard of health by necessary sanita-
tion, pure water, food supplies, light, air, hospitals and scien-
tific devices; and promoting morality. The way by which these 
eWe find a further recognition of this limitation in the very para-
grapbs of the cbarter upon which petitioners here rely. Section 179 
expressly limits the use of the initiative and referendum to acts which 
are' 'within the power conferred upon the board of supervisors to enact" 
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matters are originated and controlled is by the voters working 
and cooperating together and with their public servants, and 
speaking with judgment at the polls by their vote in choosing 
officers and passing on measures." (1 McQuillin, :Municipal 
Corporations (3d ed.) § 1.113, p. 413.) 
Our court~ have not hesitated to compel or to approve omis-
sion from the ballot of measures plainly beyond the intent of 
the people when they spoke in framing and adopting the 
constitutional enactments reserving to themselves the power of 
initiative and referendum. (See Simpson v. Hite, supra 
(1950) 36 Cal.2d 125, 133-134, and cases there cited; McFad-
den v. Jordan (1948) 32 Ca1.2d 330, 334 [4], 357 [196 P.2d 
781] ; Hunt v. Mayor ({7 Oouncil of Oity of Riverside, supra· 
(1948) 31 Cal.2d 619, 628-629 [5]; Gage v. Jordan, supra 
(1944) 23 Ca1.2d 794, 799-800 [1-4],804-807 [9] ; Mervynne v. 
Acker (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 558, 565 [9b] [11 Cal.Rptr. 
340].) Thus in Simpson, the principle was again emphasized 
by a unanimous court that the people never intended that the 
initiative or referendum apply where "the inevitable effect 
would be greatly to impair or wholly destroy the efficacy of 
some other governmp.ntal power, ... " (P. 134 [6] of 36 
Ca1.2d; see also Alexander v. Mitchell (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 
816,823-:-825 [7,8], 828 [14] [260 P.2d 261].) 
It is contended that by the use in charter section 179 of the 
phrase" declaration of policy" the people intended to reserve 
to themsel~es a unique straw vote or poll-taking device not 
common to other charters which somehow escapes the limita-
tions of the state Constitution. Assuming such was the 
purpose of the framers of the charter, it would be to no avail 
because the limitations of the Constitution must control. The 
Constitution is the measure of the power. 7 
History shows that because of frequent disputes over the 
basic policy involved in local legislative matters, governing 
boards have upon occasion utilized the referendum to ascer-
tain the will of the electorate upon the major policy decisions 
involved. Once such decisions have been settled by popular 
vote then the board has proceeded to implement such policy 
by the enactment of whatever ordinances are necessary. (See 
Hopping v. 001mcil of Oity of Richmond, supra (1915) 170 
Cal. 605, 614-617.) It was to take advantage of this method of 
ascertaining and carrying out the will of the people that the 
framers of the San Francisco Charter adopted the provision in 
7Mervynne v. ~cker, supra, 189 Ca1.App.2d 558, 565; articl~ XI, aee· 
tion 8, subdiviBion (j); article IX, section 1. 
--', 
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question. This purpose is clearly indicated by the express 
provisions making it the duty of the board to enact the ordi-
nances necessary to effectuate such policy decisions of the 
people. If, as petitioners contend, these policy determining 
procedures are not limited to municipal affairs then the 
language imposing the duty upon the board of supervisors to 
adopt the ordinances required to carry such policy into effect 
is rendered meaningless. Such an interpretation is violative of 
the fundamental rules of statutory construction. 
Petitioners seek to avoid this pitfall by suggesting that if 
the electorate adopts their proposed policy on the Vietnam 
war the board of supervisors could implement such policy by 
enacting ordinances, e.g.: to direct its legislative representa-
tive in Washington to make the people's position known; to 
rename the War Memorial Opera House as the Immediate 
Cease Fire Building; or to order the posting of the declara-
tion in public buildings. These suggestions demonstrate that 
petitioners were hard put to think of a single legislative act 
the board of supervisors could enact to effectuate the policy.s 
None of the suggested "ordinances" would qualify as any-
thing more than administrative in nature. Hardly could they 
be accorded the dignity of local legislation. To urge that such 
method of propagandizing or of denigrating a point of view 
would lend legality to the basic legislative objective is to 
demonstrate that the policy declaration sought cannot qualify 
as a" municipal aifair." 
But, note the majority in today's opinion, boards of super-
visors and city councils adopt resolutions on matters of 
national concern, so why not the electorate of their cities? 
Boards of supervisors and city councilmen are not "repre-
sentatives of local communities" on matters outside the scope 
of county and municipal affairs and certainly are not autho-
rized in any representative capacity to express the will of the 
people on matters of national policy. Congressmen are elected 
to perform this function. Under the separation of powers 
provided for by our state and federal Constitutions officials 
elected to represent cities, towns and counties in local affairs 
have no power whatever to commit or bind their local 
citizenry on non-municipal affairs. But, asserts- the majority 
opinion, "representatives of local communities" such as 
boards of supervisors and city councils, have traditionally so 
8Bection 13 of the charter requires that "every legislative act shall be 
by ordinance." 
) 
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acted in making" declarations of policy on matters of concern 
to the community whether or not they had power to e1iectuate 
such declarations by binding legislation."9 
Admittedly, in the enjoyment of the much cherished and 
exercised American privilege of speaking out without 
restraint, the minute books of such boards are replete with 
recorded resolutions on every conceivable subject, but when 
such actions transcend the constitutional powers of such a 
board their pronouncements have no legal significance 
whatever. 
When the members of such a board act in this manner on 
national issues they speak for themselves alone. Not one whit 
of "representative capacity" is added by any number of 
repetitions of such ultra vires acts. They remain the expres-
sions of the individuals involved. Such expressions of senti-
ment are no more binding upon the people of the community 
or upon the corporate entity itself than (ire the utterances of 
any group in the town square. Why then are they allowed to 
pass such resolutions, we might ask T Acceptance of public 
office does not cut 01i a person's right of free speech. And 
although from time to time someone may question the use of 
public funds and facilitities to record the individual opinions 
of supervisors on matters outside the scope of their duties and 
responsibilities, the cost to the local treasury of the adoption 
of such resolutions is minimal. The opinion of the city attor-
ney is not asked and understandably is not volunteered on the 
legality of expenditures for such purposes; and the "resolu-
tions" make good news copy; hence, they continue unabated. 
This court should not permit the past indulgence of boards in 
such practices to be used as a justification for petitioners to 
force the taxpayers of a city to finance the taking of a public 
poll on a non-municipal subject. 
We should face this problem squarely, as did the acting 
registrar and the city attorney in this case. The use of the 
election machinery of the city for any purpose involves a 
substantial expenditure of public moneys. If petitioners can 
force the use of the ballot at tl1e forthcoming regular munici. 
pal election for this purpose, the next occasion could well 
require the calling of a special municipal election to vote on 
9Petitioners set forth a number of such "ordinances." However, an 
examination of each demonstrates that not a single one was in fact an 
ordinance. Each was a "resolution" of the board of the type discussed 
here. 
) 
Sept. 1967] FARLEY V. HEALEY 
[67 C.2d 325; 62 Cal.Rptr. 26, 431 P.2d 650] 
335 
such a measure,10 involving very substantial expenses. In 
dealing with measures calling for the expenditure of public 
moneys we must be mindful of their nature. Moneys raised 
through the power of taxation are impressed with a public 
trust to be used for lawful purposes. They are extracted from 
rich and poor alike and often painfully from those scarcely 
able to pay but doing so under the penalty of loss of property 
through tax sale. 
We must also weigh the effect of today's decision upon 
other counties and cities, all of which enjoy the use of the 
initiative and r~ferendum either by state statute or local 
charter. The widespread abuse ()f the initiative as a poll-
taking device on non-municipal issues could cause the people, 
in recoiling from the resulting expense, to drastically curtail 
its use. Unabated, such abuse could destroy the concept of 
local government as we have known it and as the framers of 
our state and federal Constitutions conceived it. 
There are in every community militant groups espousing 
controversial causes of all kinds. History has demonstrated 
that signatures to petitions can be obtained for almost any 
conceivable purpose. It takes little imagination to name issues 
which one or another group might desire to force to a! munici-
pal vote: 
That capital punishment be abolished; 
That a state or federal officer be impeached; 
That civil rights marches be declared unconstitutional and 
participants jailed; 
That private school systems be abolished; 
That abortion laws be abrogated; 
That schools be segregated; 
That state universities be tuition free; 
That this country should (or should not) bomb --; 
That vivisection be a federal offense; 
That the CIA be banned; 
That the borders of the state be closed to persons of 
(whatever category) ; 
That this country wage war on --; 
That daylight saving be abolished; 
That Congress ban fluoridation; 
That marijuana be legalized. 
Not one of these issues is any further removed from munici-
10Seetion 182 of the charter. 
.' .,
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pal affairs than the agonizing problem which is the concern of 
the present petition. And what would be the ultimate effect of 
such broadening of municipal elections Y Apart from the 
illegality of such action, the injection of issues such as these 
in municipal elections would so embroil the people of any 
community "that worthy candidates for local office, seeking 
election based upon their individual records of experience and 
their platforms for municipal improvements, and perplexing 
local issues requiring close public scrutiny and attention, 
would be utterly lost in the confusion caused by the intrusion 
of such highly volatile, non-municipal issues. The quality of 
local government would greatly deteriorate in direct ratio to 
this diversion from local problems. And who is to say that this 
country can afford the slightest inattention to the awesome 
issues which confront and even threaten to destroy the Amer-
ican city Qf today' 
It is one thing to elect a state legislator, a Congressman, or 
a President on the basis of his stand on state or national 
issues, but it is quite another to judge the personal qualifica-
tions of a mayor, district attorney, assessor or supervisor 
because of, his personal views on ballot propositions not 
related to local government. 
Petitioners contend and the majority opinion declares that 
the acting registrar exceeded llis authority in undertaking to 
determine whether the proposed initiative was within the 
power of the electorate to adopt. These charges demonstrably 
are without merit. Section 180 of the San Francisco Charter is 
devoid of the limitations which the majority declare to be 
found in the section.ll Instead, it specifies, inter alia, that 
llCharter section 180, in full: 
"The filing, verification and certification of initiative, referendum and 
recall petitions shall be in accordance with general law, and rules and 
regulations of the registrar of voters relative to details not covered by 
general law, except as otherwise provided by this charter. Any signer 
to a petition may withdraw his name from the same by filing with the 
registrar of voters a verified revocation of his signature before the filing 
of the petition. No signature can be revoked after the petition has been 
filed. Unless and until it be proven otherwise by official investigation by 
the registrar, it shall be presumed that the petition filed conforms to all 
legnl requirements and contains the signatures of the requisite number of 
registered voters, and after an election based thereon, the sufficiency of 
such petition shall not be questioned. 
"If any signature be questioned, the registrar shall mail notice to 
such purported signer, stating that his or her name is attached to such 
petition and citing him or her to appear before said registrar forthwith, 
naming the time and place. Said citation shall enclose a blank affidavit, 
which may be used to deny that the affiant signed such petition. If such 
'Person does not desire to attend in person, he may swear to such affidavit 
) 
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"Unless and until it be proven otherwise by official investiga-
tion by the registrar, it shall be presumed that the petition 
filed conforms to all lega-l requirements and contains" suffi-
cient qualified signatures. (Italics added.) 
Moreover, section 173 of the charter in its first sentence tells 
the registrar that "The conduct, management and control of 
. . . the holding of elections, and of all matters pertain-ing to 
eu.lctions in the city and county shall be vested exclusively" 
in him. (Italics added.) Section 26 of the charter instructs the 
city attorney to "give his advice or opinion in writing to any 
ofiicer, board or commission of the city and county when 
requested." The city attorney advised that the declaration 
set forth in the proposed initiative measure may not properly 
be placed on the ballot and that the registrar should refuse to 
accept the petitions for filing in his office. Accordingly, the 
registrar did so refuse. 
That this is the accepted, customary and approved proce-
dure by which responsible public officials attempt to deter-
mine and to carry out their duties in the premises is 
demonstrated repeatedly by decisions of the appellate courts 
of this state.12 In Riednwn v. Br-ison (1933) 217 Cal. 383 (18 
P.2d 947], now dismissed by the majority as having "had no 
of denial before any officer authorized to take oaths, and mail the same 
to the registrar. If he does not so attend and deny such signature in 
pc-rson or by making and mailing such affidavit of denial before the 
time when the registrar must, under general law, make final determina-
tion, the signature to such petition must be treated as genuine. The 
registrar shall keep a list of the names of all purported signers who 
appear before him and deny their signatures under oath, and also file 
and keep such affidavits for at least one year." 
12With respect to proposed initiative or referendum measures, see the 
following: Housing Authority v. Superior Oourt (1950) 35 Cal.2d 550, 
555 [219 P.2d 457], in which this court issued prohibition to halt man-
damus proceedings by which it was sought to compel the city clerk of 
Los Angeles to file a referendum petition ; Myers v. Stringham (1925) 
195 Cal. 672, 673 [235 P. 448]; Dwyer v. Oity Oouncil (1927) 200 Cal. 
505, 508-509 [253 P. 932]; Mervynne v. Acker, supra (1961) 189 Cal. 
App.2d 558, 560, 562 [6]; Alexander v. Mitchell, supra (1953) 119 Cal. 
App.2d 816, 818, 829 [16]; Hyde v. Wilde (1921) 51 Cal.App. 82, 85-86 
[2] [196 P. 118]; Ohase v. Kalber (1915) 28 Cal.App. 561, 564 [153 P. 
397]; Bennett v. Drullard (1915) 27 Cal.App. 180, 187 [149 P. 368]; 
see also Hunt v. Mayor ~ Oouncil of Oity of Riverside, supra (1948) 
31 Ca1.2d 619, 621. 
With respect to proposed municipal bond issues, see e.g. Oity of Walnut 
Creek v. Silveira, supra (1957) 47 Ca1.2d 804, 807, and Oity of Oxnard 
v. Dale (1955) 45 Ca1.2d 729, 731 [1] [290 P.2d 859], in both of which, 
as in the present case, the duties of the local official were ministerial and 
to be compelled by mandamus "if the proposed issue meets the require-
ments of the law," (found in Constitution and statutes) as to the pur-
poses for which the bonds may issue and the revenue sources available 
to pay them. (Italics added.) 
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occasion to consider" the matter, this court in denying 
mandamus to com.pel a city clerk to examine and certify an 
initiat·ive petition, declared at the outset (p. 386 [1]) that 
"the question is one of law relating to the jurisdiction of the 
city clerk to act at all in this matter," and ruled (pp. 387-
388 [3]) that" The matter to which the petition in the hands 
of the city clerk relates, not being a matter of municipal legis-
lation, that official has no legal duty to perform in relation to 
it under the cllarter." (Italics added.) McFadden v. Jordan, 
supra (1948) 32 Ca1.2d 330, 332, cited by the majority in 
support of their attack on the registrar, not only does not 
discuss, much less support, the proposition for which it is 
advanced, but instead briefly states that "Mandamus is a 
proper remedy" to compel omission of a proposed initiative 
measure from the ballot. These citations fully support the 
responsible city officials in their actions here. 
In conclusion, there is an understandable reluctance on the 
part of judges to take any step which on its face may appear 
to thwart the will of the electorate. It is especially so where, 
as here, to act would frustrate the desires of an alleged 21,000 
signers of the proposed initiative petition. In considering the 
will of the electorate, however, we must recall that it was the 
voters of the entire state who limited the legislative powers of 
supervisors and of the local electorate. Consequently, in 
holding this attempted legislative act invalid the court would 
be declaring the sovereign will of the people of the state as a 
whole. (1 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed.) § 1.96, 
p. 354.) Authorities in municipal government have listed as 
one of the major defects of such governments in this country 
the failure to separate national and state politics from local 
issues in municipal elections and administration. (1 McQuil-
lin, op. cit. supra, § 1.114, p. 416.) The decision of this court 
today opens the door to compounding this defect a thousand-
fold. 
The writ sought should be denied. 
McComb, J., concurred. \ 
